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The long-term determinants of marital fertility in the developed
world (19th and 20th centuries):
The role of welfare policies
Jesús J. Sánchez-Barricarte1
Abstract
BACKGROUND
Demographic transition theory was shattered dramatically as a result of the research
carried out in the course of the Princeton European Fertility Project. There is still no
consensus among demographers as to the causes underlying the fertility transition.
OBJECTIVE
We set out to test the explanatory capacity of certain variables which have traditionally
been used to interpret the historical decline in fertility (mortality, level of education,
economic development, urbanization) as well as the role played by the rise of the
welfare state.
METHODS
We collected information on different kinds of socioeconomic variables in 25
developed countries over a very long period of time. We carried out panel cointegrating
regressions and country panel fixed and time effects generalized least squares.
RESULTS
We show that the decline in mortality, the increase in educational level, and economic
factors all played a leading role in the historical decline in fertility. We found that the
present welfare system places a remarkable burden on those who decide to have a
family.
CONCLUSIONS
A new kind of public social transfer model needs to be designed which will minimize
the damaging consequences that our current welfare states have had with regard to
fertility.
CONTRIBUTION
1) The emphasis on the causal impact of the emergence and maturation of the social
welfare  system  using  Lindert’s  data  on  social  transfers  since  the  late  19th  century  to
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1990. 2) The enormous amount of historical data compiled, as documented in the
Appendix. 3) The modern panel cointegration techniques used to analyze the long- and
short-term impacts of the different determinants of fertility.
1. Introduction
Although demographic transition (the process by which much of Europe and North
America went from high to low fertility in the 19th and early 20th centuries) could be
described as one of the most important processes affecting society in the last 500 years
(on a level with the industrial revolution, migration to the cities, or the spread of
education), there is still no consensus as to its causes.
The first researchers to devote their attention to demographic transition saw the
decline in fertility as the result of various social and economic changes, such as
industrialization, urbanization, education, and decline in mortality (Landry 1933;
Notestein 1945; Davis 1945). This theory, traditionally regarded as one of the most
popular sociological theories, was shattered dramatically as a result of research carried
out in the course of the Princeton European Fertility Project (PEFP). The PEFP’s
outcomes (Coale and Watkins 1986) clearly pointed to a cultural interpretation of
fertility, in contrast to the economic factors which had been emphasized by
demographic transition theory (Cleland and Wilson 1987). However, the conclusions
drawn from PEFP were based on flawed statistical methodology: “the project [PEFP]
itself never used these tools [panel data techniques]. These tools were not in widespread
use when the project was undertaken, so noting this drawback is not a criticism of the
PEFP authors. But advances in econometric modelling have made clear the limitations
of their approach” (Brown and Guinnane 2007: 585).
John Caldwell (1976, 1982) proposed a new definition of demographic transition
theory which emphasized the role of cultural changes. He associated the fertility
transition with a change in the direction of “intergenerational wealth flows.” According
to his theory, decisions about reproduction in all societies are economically rational
responses to family wealth flows. Other widely recognized theories that purport to
explain the demographic decline are those developed by economists Gary Becker
(1981) and Richard Easterlin (1975, 1987). Becker built on the idea that variations in
fertility can be understood within the framework that economists use to analyze long-
lasting goods.
Many of these theories have come in for harsh criticism and their validity has been
called into question (Turchi 1975; Westoff 1983; Kirk 1996; Guinnane 2011). Even
though they try to explain the timing of and reasons for the onset of the fall in fertility,
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in no sense do they account for the baby boom and the baby bust that happened later.
Both the beginning and the end of the baby boom came as a surprise to demographers
and social scientists (Macunovich 2002) and although various theories have been
devised to shed light on this unexpected phenomenon (most of which center on the
specific case of the United States), there are still many unanswered questions, like the
causal role played by male and female labor force participation, how socioeconomic
groups contributed to higher fertility, what the effects of education were, and why the
recovery of fertility started before World War II (Van Bavel and Reher 2013: 270–271).
It is necessary to continue work on developing a new theoretical framework, since, as
Cummins says (2009), the fertility transition in Europe is still one of the great enigmas
of  economic  history.  There  is  no  consensus  among demographers  about  the  causes  of
this ‘fertility revolution’ or on the complex set of motives which triggered this change.
The new theoretical framework has to come up with answers to explain the onset of the
decline in fertility, as well as its later fluctuations (the baby boom and baby bust).
Using aggregate country-level analysis on a large dataset from 25 developed
countries, and applying tests of cointegration and panel analysis techniques, we set out
to test the explanatory capacity of certain variables which have traditionally been used
to interpret the historical decline in fertility (mortality, level of education, economic
development), as well as the role played by the rise of the welfare state.
2. Our hypothesis: The socioeconomic factors
The social, economic, and political transformations that developed countries have
undergone since the late 19th century have been extraordinary. Western societies have
experienced dramatic changes regarding family and gender roles, the position of women
in the workplace, new forms of partnership and family, life expectancy, social
inequalities and mobility, politics, work, consumption, and leisure, accompanied by the
generalized move to the cities and major changes in education, religious practice, and
culture (Tomka 2013). Since fertility behavior takes place in a multilevel setting of
biological, psychological, social, economic, cultural, and political conditions, the level
of fertility observed in a country over time is the result of a complex interaction
between many factors from different areas of life (Esping-Andersen 2013; Huinink,
Kohli, and Ehrhardt 2015). We do not rule out the possibility that any one of the
socioeconomic transformations that have happened in the Western world over the last
150 years might have influenced declining fertility levels.
Broadly speaking, theories about the decline in fertility fall into two categories:
adjustment (socioeconomic, demand) theories, which hold that changes in
socioeconomic conditions encouraged couples to have smaller families; and innovation
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(diffusionist, ideational) theories, which take the view that the decline came about as a
result of new birth control methods and new ideas about the benefits of having fewer
children (Carlsson 1966).2 Although most scholars accept that both aspects are
important, controversy still rages as to which predominates (Bryant 2007). Building on
our analysis of the data set out in this article, we come down firmly on the side of the
first category, that is, that socioeconomic conditions played the most important part in
the historical decline in fertility. While accepting that the decline in fertility is due to a
huge number of factors, our hypothesis is that, as demographic transition theory
originally maintained, decline in mortality and economic factors both played a leading
role in this change. Another of our main hypotheses is that increased social spending
per capita on transfer payments to older people was also a determinant of lower fertility.
The main variables that we shall consider are as follows:
Mortality level: Since mortality decreased before fertility in most countries, many
demographers believe that the former decline caused the latter. However, the available
econometric evidence yields a mixed picture. The first researchers to question the
relationship between these two variables were those working on the PEFP (van de
Walle 1986; Watkins 1986). Recent empirical evidence shows that the drop in child
mortality was not the trigger for the decline in fertility during demographic transition
(Doepke 2005; Fernández-Villaverde 2001).
Common sense tells us that mortality should be the cornerstone of demographic
systems  –  in  both  the  past  and  the  present  –  and,  despite  the  questions  raised  by  the
research associated with the PEFP, some recent studies have confirmed that the onset of
the historical decline in fertility was linked to an earlier drop in mortality rates (Mason
1997; Galloway, Lee, and Hammel 1998; Cleland 2001; Reher and Sanz Gimeno 2007;
Dyson 2010; Van Poppel et al. 2012; Schellekens and van Poppel 2012). In a recent
article we also showed the important role of mortality in conditioning reproduction over
the last two centuries (Sánchez-Barricarte 2017).
Some experts (Reher 1999) consider that one of the main shortcomings of the
PEFP was that it used the infant mortality rate as the sole indicator of the intensity of
mortality. Matthiessen and McCann (1978) and Wrigley (1969) indicated that in most
European countries the mortality rate among children aged 1 to 14 years fell long before
the infant mortality rate. There is a sizable group of researchers who consider that it is
impossible to assess the effect of mortality on the drop in fertility by taking only infant
mortality into account. Parents’ main aim as far as reproduction is concerned was, and
2 It is, of course, a gross oversimplification to group these theories into two competing paradigms. Coale’s
(1973) Ready-Willing-Able model and the later refinement of this model by Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988)
made a much more nuanced argument about the relationship between different explanations of fertility
decline, linking adjustment and innovation. A considerable amount of literature also stresses that innovation
and adjustment should not be seen as competing explanations but are largely complementary (Cleland and
Wilson 1987; Casterline 2001a and 2001b; Palloni 2001).
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still is, to reach a number of “surviving children who will reach adulthood,” not simply
“children who survive their first year.” At the very least, taking into account only the
deaths of children aged less than one year would be inadequate to capture the desired
effects, since this figure cannot possibly tell  us much about the whole story. We think
that a reasonable indicator of the mortality rate that parents would take into account
when deciding the size of their family is 25q0 (i.e., the likelihood of dying in the first 25
years of life). We chose 25 because this is roughly the average age at which people
marry/have children (and thus leave the household to form their own families) and
because  we  consider  that  survival  to  this  age  would  be  a  good  indicator  of  the  way
couples perceived the patterns of mortality around them when they took decisions
concerning reproduction.
Economic development: We assume that the gradual economic development of the
societies in question was an outstanding factor in discouraging reproduction because it
gave parents greater economic independence from their children. In historical times, in
societies  with  a  high  poverty  rate,  children  were  a  way  of  saving  for  the  future  and
protecting oneself against unforeseen circumstances (accidents, diseases) as well as
preparing for old age. As the income per capita rose, couples were able to save more,
acquired greater independence, and became less dependent on their children.
At the same time, when people’s per capita income rose, so did the opportunity
cost for parents (above all, for mothers, when they entered the workplace). The increase
in per capita income was due in large measure to industrial development, which was
concentrated in cities. The rise in income is therefore also a reflection of the process by
which the population came to be concentrated in urban areas (traditionally, fertility
rates have been lower in cities than in the countryside).
It is hardly surprising that over a century before the general decline in fertility in
Europe set in, it had already begun in a few economically privileged social groups, as
Livi Bacci (1986: 198) pointed out: “In the aristocracies and in the prominent social
classes, the decline begins to be evident by the end of the seventeenth century.” It is our
belief that at the same time as economic development came to benefit a larger
percentage of the population, fertility rates (measured by the number of children
surviving to adulthood) dwindled.
There is no shortage of empirical evidence disproving the theory that economic
development leads to a decline in fertility. As Guinnane says (2011), some researchers
maintain that the synchronous nature of the fertility transition in all Western European
countries is proof that economics has little to do with the fertility transition. Cleland and
Wilson (1987: 18) maintain that “clearly the simultaneity and speed of the European
transition make it highly doubtful that any economic force could be found which was
powerful enough to offer a reasonable explanation.” Murtin (2013) (based on a panel of
countries in the period 1870–2000) shows that per capita income was positively
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correlated with fertility rates (once mortality and educational levels have been factored
in).
The emergence of the welfare state: As Boldrin and Jones state (2002: 786), “in
poor, agricultural societies, the impetus for having children in the first place is as an
investment rather than as consumption. That is, children are borne out of a need to staff
the farm when the parents grow older.” In other words, in contrast to most researchers,
who assume that parents are concerned about their children’s welfare (Becker 1960;
Becker and Barro 1988), they think that, historically, parents tended to have children
because this was the means available for ensuring that they themselves would be cared
for  in  their  old  age.  Neher  (1971)  was  one  of  the  first  to  defend  this  point  of  view,
which sees “children as an investment.”
The old-age security hypothesis suggests that in the absence of capital markets
children serve as an asset that permits parents to transfer income to old age. From this
theoretical perspective, parents had children only to guarantee economic support in their
old age (Ehrlich and Lui 1991; Raut and Srinivansan 1994; Chakrabarti 1999; Boldrin,
De Nardi, and Jones 2015). This meant that when efficient private financial markets
developed, the demand for children dropped.
Along the same lines, when states began to implement social security measures
around the end of the 19th century, particularly intended to protect mature and elderly
people (health care, unemployment benefits, accident insurance, legal aid, old age
pensions, etc.), couples started to lose interest in having a large number of children. As
these social security measures came to benefit a larger number of elderly people, the
need for children fell. Moreover, as Van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) show, the
pension systems developed in Western countries mean that people who have not had
children can receive a pension without having contributed economically to future
generations.
Historically, mutual support between spouses and solid parent–child relationships
(the strong family) made it easier for people to survive. Parents had children, fed them,
and brought them up, secure in the knowledge that they would be able to count on them
when,  in  the  future,  they  needed  someone  to  care  for  them  –  if  they  were  poor  or
physically incapacitated, because of either illness or accident, or simply as a result of
old age. When, in the late 19th century, some states established social security measures
that gave priority to the needs of adults and the elderly rather than those of children and
young couples of childbearing age, the historical balance in family relationships was
lost. When economic security in old age, which was traditionally provided by children,
was  replaced  by  state  benefits,  the  incentive  to  have  a  large  number  of  children  was
reduced.
There are as yet no empirical studies which link the historical decline in fertility in
the late 19th or early 20th century to the emergence of welfare policies that protect the
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adult or elderly population. Various researchers have discussed the influence which
public  policies  have  had  on  fertility  rates  since  World  War  II  (McDonald  2006;  Vos
2009; Neyer 2013). In the relevant literature, several authors voice the opinion that the
decrease in fertility is a consequence of the pension system (Van Groezen, Leers, and
Meijdam 2003; Sinn 2007; Cigno and Werding 2007; Ehrlich and Kim 2007; Van
Groezen and Meijdam 2008; Gahvari 2009; Cigno 2010; Fenge and von Weizsäcker
2010; Regös 2014; Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones 2015). However, all these studies
focus on periods later than 1960. We think that it might be interesting to establish
whether at the very beginning of this process, in the late 19th century, public policies
concerning social care (social transfers) may have had an impact on people’s
reproductive decisions.
Since  bringing up children  requires  parents  to  make great  sacrifices  (not  only  in
terms of money), social benefits designed to reduce the cost and effort of bringing up
children (family allowances, education, nurseries) should obviously have a positive
effect on fertility levels. Many studies have analyzed the positive effects of family
policies on fertility (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005;
Hilgeman and Butts 2009; Adsera 2011; Thévenon and Gauthier 2011; Luci-Greulich
and Thévenon 2013). So it is also our hypothesis that social benefits intended to protect
the adult or elderly population have a completely different impact on fertility rates from
those designed to care for the child population: the former have a negative effect on
fertility, the latter a positive one. The fertility rates of different countries should
therefore vary as a function of the resources they devote to covering the needs of one or
other extreme of the demographic pyramid.
Education level: According to Caldwell (1980: 227–228), an increase in the
educational level in a society reduces the chances of children working (at home or
outside), increases the cost of bringing them up, and therefore brings down the fertility
rate. We believe that it is important to measure the impact of the educational level of
the population in a given country, because this has traditionally been thought to affect
fertility: it can affect preferences for fertility timing, raise female autonomy, increase
contraceptive use, and raise the opportunity costs of childbearing, and reduces the
child’s potential for work inside and outside the home. Education can also reduce
fertility strongly if opportunity costs increase with schooling (Caldwell 1980; Jejeebhoy
1995; Gustafsson and Kalwij 2006; Skirbekk, Kohler, and Prskawetz 2004). Empirical
evidence demonstrates that investment in education was a dominating force in the
decline in fertility (Doepke 2004; Becker, Cinnirella, and Woessmann 2010; Murtin
2013).
Urbanization: Traditional demographic transition theory also establishes that the
percentage of the urban population (Urbpop) has a major impact on the changes from
high to low fertility (Notestein 1945). Even though the PEFP concluded that the
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“urban–rural fertility differentials have limited value for the study of the demographic
transition” (Sharlin 1986: 260), we think that the move to towns could be an important
explanatory variable when considering the historical decline in fertility.
We tried to obtain information on the development of the urban population in our
group of countries. Unfortunately, the United Nations does not use its own definition of
‘urban population’ but follows the definition used in each country (United Nations
Population Division 2014). Some countries consider settlements with more than 1,000
inhabitants to be urban, others set the limit at 2,500, and others at 10,000. Despite the
lack  of  a  consistent  definition  of  what  an  urban  population  is  in  each  country,  we
decided to include this variable in some of our statistical analysis.3 We  took  the
definition of urban in each country at face value. Since what we are interested in is an
idea of “urban-ness,” we considered that this would be satisfactory (the same amount of
“urban-ness” may be consistent with different actual population totals in different
countries).
3. Data
Some recent researchers working on the long-run determinants of fertility use indicators
of the “total fertility rate” in their econometric models (Herzer, Strulik, and Vollmer
2012; Murtin 2013). Given that throughout the demographic transition in Western
countries the overwhelming majority of births occurred within marriage, the effect of
nuptiality is normally factored in by calculating indicators that measure fertility only
among married women. Historically, the total fertility rate depended not only on how
many children each married woman had but also on how many women married. To
avoid possible distortions of fertility rates caused by nuptiality, we considered that it
would be more suitable to use an indicator which measures only the fertility of married
women. One very widely used indicator in historical studies is that known as the
Princeton marital fertility index (Ig),
4 which we believe to be useful still, despite some
published criticisms (Guinnane, Okun, and Trussell 1994; Brown and Guinnane 2007).
For the purposes of this study, we collected information on marital fertility and
mortality in 25 developed countries over a very long period of time. We also obtained
various kinds of socioeconomic information needed to apply the statistical models
specified below. We have included the largest number of countries for which we were
3 We were able to obtain information about the level of urban-ness for each country only from 1950 onwards
(United Nations Population Division 2014) and so we included this variable only in the statistical models in
Table 3 (covering the period from 1960 to 2010).
4 Ig is the ratio of the number of births occurring to married women to the number that would occur if married
women were subject to maximum fertility (married Hutterite women) (Coale and Watkins 1986: 153–162).
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able to find historical data of proven reliability: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In
the Appendix we provide a list of the large number of sources consulted.
All the statistical analyses in this study are based on aggregated data from specific
countries. Some scholars (Guinnane and Brown 2002; Reher and Sanz Gimeno 2007;
van Poppel et al. 2012) have expressed great scepticism as to the usefulness of
aggregated data for understanding changes in reproductive behaviors in the past. Brown
and Guinnane (2007) argued that the aggregated data referring to very large units of
analysis masked considerable internal heterogeneity. They have recommended using
information about individual cases obtained through family reconstruction techniques.
Individual-level data might yield more nuanced results that help fit the theory better, but
unfortunately they cannot cover such a broad geographical area or such a long time
period. Although correlations that are based on aggregated data may be higher than
correlations based on individual-level data, aggregated data enabled us to amass a data
set for a considerable number of countries, far beyond what would be possible with
microdata.
4. Results of our analysis
To analyze the role of the different socioeconomic variables in the historical decline in
marital fertility, we carried out two kinds of statistical tests which are explained below.
Our aim was to improve our understanding of the different determining factors affecting
marital fertility in the long and the short run, and to provide more consistent results.
4.1 Country panel cointegrating regressions
When time series are used to measure the relationship between two trending variables
one often gets spurious regression results (i.e., although the variables are apparently not
related, statistically significant effects are obtained). Often detrending helps to eliminate
spurious regression results, but this technique does not work either when the variables
are difference-stationary, also labeled I(1).5 Tests of cointegration can be used to test
5 Difference-stationarity means that the mean trend is stochastic (random process). Differencing the series D
times yields a stationary stochastic process.
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whether the relationship between two I(1) variables is true or spurious (Engelhardt,
Kögel, and Prskawetz 2001: 11–12).
Recently a series of studies has been published which apply modern panel
cointegration techniques to analyze the impact of different socioeconomic variables on
fertility in the long term (Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou 2002, 2005; Narayan and Peng
2006; Hondroyiannis 2010; Ángeles 2010; Frini and Muller 2012; Herzer, Strulik, and
Vollmer 2012; Hafner and Mayer-Foulkes 2013; Murtin 2013; Bakar, Haseeb, and
Hartini 2014; Hartani, Bakar, and Haseeb 2015). Panel studies offer many advantages
over time series and cross-sectional analyses. Having multiple years of data increases
the sample size and may lead to more reliable estimates. Also, having multiple
observations for each country enables researchers to include country-specific fixed
effects, thereby controlling for a wide range of time-invariant country characteristics
whose omission might otherwise bias the estimated relationship between the variables
(Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou 2005: 145).
We apply this kind of technique on the database constructed for this study.
Specifically, we utilize the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) and the
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS). These models indicate the long-term impact
of the different determinants of fertility. The FMOLS is a nonparametric estimation
which helps us to correct the problem of the serial correlation, while the DOLS is a
parametric estimation which controls for the effect of endogeneity. This type of
multivariate analysis can clearly estimate heterogeneous cointegrating relationships in
country-by-country and panel bases.
To apply these models, we first had to check that all our variables were I(1).
Secondly, we obtained the cointegration equations by using tests such as those of Kao
(1999) and Fisher (1932) (the Appendix provides more details about the process of
calculating these panel dynamics).
Consider the following simple panel regression model:
. ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ݔ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧          (1)
ݔ௜௧ = ݔ௜,௧ିଵ + ߝ௜௧          (2)
Equation (1) expresses the cointegration relationship of the independent variables
with respect to the dependent variable (we also assume that the dependent variable is
difference-stationary). Equation (2) indicates that the independent variables are
difference-stationary.
From equation (2), Kao and Chiang (2000) expressed that FMOLS and DOLS are
asymptotically normal. The coefficient of the FMOLS estimator could be obtained from
the following equations:
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ߚመிெை௅ௌ = [∑ ∑ (ݔ௜௧ − ̅ݔ௜)
ᇱ்
௧ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ ]
ିଵൣ∑ (∑ (ݔ௜௧ − ̅ݔ௜)ŷ௜௧
ା + ܶẑகஜ
ା்
௧ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ )൧,          (3)
where ẑகஜ
ା  is the serial correlation term and ŷ௜௧
ା  is the transformation of ݕ௜௧ to achieve the
endogeneity correction.6 The serial correlation and the endogeneity can also be
corrected by using the DOLS estimator. In order to obtain an unbiased estimator of the
long-run parameters, the DOLS estimator uses parametric adjustment to the errors by
including the past and future values of the differenced I(1) regressors. The dynamic
OLS estimator is obtained from the following equation:
ݕ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ݔ′௜௧ߚ + ∑ ܿ௜௝
௝ୀ௤మ
௝ୀି௤భ
∆ݔ௜,௧ା௝ + ݒ௜௧,          (4)
where ܿ௜௝  is the coefficient of a lead or lag of first differenced explanatory variables.
The estimated coefficient of DOLS is given by:
ߚመ஽ை௅ௌ = ∑ [∑ ݖ௜௧ݖ′௜௧
்
௧ୀଵ ]
ே
௜ୀଵ
ିଵ [∑ ݖ௜௧ŷ௜௧
ା்
௧ୀଵ ],          (5)
where ݖ௜௧ = [ݔ௜௧ − ̅ݔ௜ , ∆ݔ௜,௧ି௤ , … , ∆ݔ௜,௧ା௤] is 2(q+1)x1 vector of regressors.
The DOLS model is similar to equation (1) but introduces lags in the independent
variables, which means that it generates a more efficient estimate.
The unit root tests, the central basis for proceeding to panel cointegration
modeling, were performed to find the order of integration of the different variables. We
obtained information for the dependent variable (marital fertility Ig) and the following
independent variables: gross domestic product per capita expressed with inflation
adjustment in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars (GDPpc), probability of dying
before age 25 (25q0), and average years of total schooling for both sexes (Education)
(see the Appendix for the sources from which this information was obtained).
We divided the sample into two large time periods which correspond to very
different historical periods. In the first, from 1871 to 1949, the initial phases of the
fertility transition took place. In the second, from 1950 to 2008, most of the baby boom
and subsequent baby bust occurred.
Table 1 shows the results of the panel cointegration to explain the dependent
variable Ig (marital fertility) using data from 20 countries.
7 One result shared by all the
models calculated in both periods is that the relationships between the dependent
variable (Ig) and 25q0 and Education are always highly significant and display the
6 An endogeneity problem occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity
can arise as a result of measurement error, simultaneous causality, and omitted variables.
7 Of the 25 countries, five were not included in the model (Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, and the
Russian Federation) because we lacked one variable or because the data covered only a small proportion of
the period analyzed (1871–2008).
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expected signs, that is, a decrease in mortality depresses marital fertility and an increase
in education decreases fertility in the long term. The variable GDPpc appears to be
statistically significant for both periods in only one of the four specifications that we
carried out (FMOLS with constant). The results concerning mortality (25q0) and per
capita income (GDPpc) are consistent with those obtained by Herzer, Strulik, and
Vollmer (2012).
Table 1: Country panel cointegrating regressions (Ig dependent variable)
Period 1871–1949
FMOLS1 DOLS2
Variable Constant
Constant and
trends Constant
Constant and
trends
GDPpc
–0.00001 *** 0.000001 –0.000001 0.000002
2.14E-06 2.16E-06 4.09E-06 4.23E-06
25q0
0.9492 *** 0.5992 *** 1.0056 *** 0.6845 ***
0.02649 0.05208 0.06266 0.09982
Education
–0.0336 *** –0.0103 ** –0.0381 *** –0.0390 ***
0.00201 0.00492 0.00495 0.00917
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.96
Obs. 1,318
(unbalanced)
1,318
(unbalanced)
1,308
(unbalanced)
1,306
(unbalanced)
Units 20   20 20   20
Period 1950–2008
FMOLS1 DOLS2
Variable Constant
Constant and
trends Constant
Constant and
trends
GDPpc
–0.000002 *** 0.000001 –0.00000 –0.000001
5.47E-07 9.75E-07 1.21E-06 2.09E-06
25q0
1.3045 *** 1.5047 *** 2.0397 *** 1.9061 ***
0.09326 0.13499 0.30345 0.36222
Education
–0.0147 *** –0.0254 ** –0.0177 *** –0.0298 ***
0.00177 0.00229 0.00345 0.00425
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.87 0.88 0.92
Obs. 1148
(unbalanced)
1148
(unbalanced)
1137
(unbalanced)
1137
(unbalanced)
Units 20   20 20   20
Notes: p-value *** <0.01, ** <0.05; standard errors in italics
1 FMOLS. Lag specification based on AIC information to compute long-run covariance and allowing for heterogeneous first-stage
long-run coefficients
2 DOLS. Automatic AIC information to select number of lags and leads
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4.2 Country panel fixed and time effects generalized least squares
According to Tomka (2013: 157), examination of the dates of introduction of social
security schemes in 16 European countries shows that accident and health insurance,
pensions, and unemployment benefits (which mainly help mature or elderly people)
were established before family allowances. In its origins, the welfare state was designed
principally to protect the elderly (Lindert 2004: 183–186).
Lindert (1994, 2004) calculated the percentage of GDP spent on social transfers in
various Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries from
1880 to 1930 and from 1960 to 1990. To compute this percentage, he takes into account
the sum of transfers dedicated to welfare, unemployment, pensions, health, and housing
subsidies. He does not include expenditure on education, which is one of the main
budgetary areas that benefit only children and young people. Since education is left out,
Lindert’s estimates basically measure the effort that different countries have made to
care for the adult and elderly population (this demographic segment is the main
beneficiary of all the sections of the budget taken into consideration). We can use this
information to test whether social protection and care for the elderly act as deterrents
against fertility. We calculated the social transfers per capita (STpc) in each country by
multiplying the proportions of the GDP dedicated to social transfers computed by
Lindert (1994) by the GDPpc computed by Maddison (2009).8
In the previous model, we were unable to include the variable social transfers per
capita (STpc) since Lindert (1994) provides data only for the periods 1880–1930 and
1960–1990. To be able to analyze the possible effect of this variable on the historical
decline in fertility, we applied a regression with fixed and time effects generalized least
squares.9 The formal expression is as follows:
ܫ௚,௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ∗ GDPpc௜,௧ + ߚଶ ∗ STpc௜ ,௧ + ߚଷ ∗ Education௜,௧ + ߚସ ∗ qଶହ ଴௜,௧ + ߓ௧ + ߙ௜ + ߝ௜ ,௧,    (6)
where Ig is the index of marital fertility, GDPpc is the gross domestic product per capita
for each country (inflation-adjusted expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis
dollars), STpc is the social transfers per capita, 25q0 is the probability of dying before
the  age  of  25  (both  sexes),  Education  is  the  average  years  of  total  schooling  for  both
sexes, ߓ௧ is a vector of yearly dummies controlling for time effects, and ߙ௜ is  a  set  of
fixed effects accounting for the heterogeneity between countries. The Appendix lists the
8 GDP per capita for each country is inflation-adjusted, expressed in 1990 International Geary-Khamis
dollars.
9 To see if time effects were needed when running a fixed effects model, we used a test to see if the dummies
for all years were equal to 0 (testparm in Stata). We rejected the null hypothesis, so time effects were needed.
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sources from which this information was obtained and also gives technical details about
this statistical model.
The results of this analysis (Table 2) show us that the GDPpc had a negative effect
on marital fertility throughout the period under study (1880–1990); that is, as we stated
in our hypothesis, the increase in income per capita discouraged reproduction.10
Mortality (measured by 25q0), as might be expected, did have a statistically significant
effect in the expected direction (positive) in the period analyzed (1880–1990). This also
ratifies the results we obtained in the previous models in Table 1; that is, it confirms
that the drop in mortality had a positive impact on the historical decline in marital
fertility. Equally, as we might expect, we can once more observe that the increase in
years of schooling had a negative (and statistically significant) effect on the evolution
of marital fertility rates.
The variable representing social transfers per capita (STpc) also had a negative
correlation,11 which seems to indicate that the incipient welfare policies (mainly
intended to cover the needs of the adult and elderly population) may also have had the
effect of depressing marital fertility. In Model 6 on Table 2 we included the variable
STpc with lags, so we may infer causality and rule out the possibility that higher
fertility  leads  to  more  welfare  spending on young people,  as  it  raises  the  demand for
such welfare. Transfers to the elderly shifted from a private, family-based institution to
a public, tax-based institution. The expected number children thus declined as they
became less relevant for old-age security. The welfare state displaced the family and
took over the basic functions which are inherent to it by nature, supplanting its social
role.
10 The negative association of fertility with economic development is one of the most generally accepted
empirical regularities in the social sciences (Bryant 2007; Lee 2003; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996).
11 As we said before, for 1940 and 1950 we were unable to obtain information about social transfers in the
different countries. This is why the number of data points drops in Models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 2 when we
include the variable STpc.
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Table 2: Country panel fixed and time effects generalized least squares (Ig
dependent variable), developed countries (1880–1990)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 7.02E-01 *** 5.77E-01 *** 6.47E-01 *** 6.57E-01 *** 6.49E-01 *** 6.59E-01 ***
1.49E-02 1.69E-02 1.73E-02 2.17E-02 2.24E-02 2.17E-02
GDPpc –2.87E-06 *** –6.72E-06 *** –6.38E-06 *** –3.70E-06 ** –4.16E-06 ***
8.56E-07 9.05E-07 9.12E-07 1.55E-06 1.55E-06
25q0 4.54E-01 *** 5.33E-01 *** 4.24E-01 *** 4.03E-01 *** 4.44E-01 ***
2.96E-02 2.96E-02 4.12E-02 4.27E-02 4.18E-02
Education –2.22E-02 *** –1.65E-02 *** –1.59E-02 *** –1.78E-02 ***
1.72E-03 2.47E-03 2.57E-03 2.50E-03
STpc –9.31E-06 ** –1.24E-05 ***
3.65E-06 3.58E-06
STpct-1 –7.22E-06 **
3.72E-06
n
countries
  23   24   23   22   22   21
N data
points
  2,241   2,209   2,150   1,315   1,315   1,300
R2 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94
Time
period
1880–1990 1880–1990 1880–1990 1880–1930 and
1960–1990
1880–1930 and
1960–1990
1880–1930 and
1960–1990
Notes: p-value *** <0.01, ** <0.05; standard errors in italics
Source: See Appendix
Figure 1 shows the actual marital fertility index (Ig) values and those predicted (by
Model 6 in Table 2) for each country. It also shows the difference between the actual
and the predicted values. We can see that, in general, the predicted values fit quite
closely to the actual values. France is the only case where the fit is not close. As is well
known, the historical decline in fertility in France started 100 years before that in the
rest of Europe (Coale and Watkins 1986). It should therefore come as no surprise that
the French actual values for the period 1880–1920 are well below those predicted by the
statistical model. On the other hand, the French government’s generous pioneering
incentives designed to raise the birth rate in the last few decades almost certainly
explain why in 1960–1990 the actual values are well above those predicted by the
model.
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Figure 1: Actual and predicted marital fertility values (Ig), developed countries
(1880–1990)
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Figure 1: (Continued)
Note: Predicted marital fertility values (Ig) calculated using Model 6 in Table 2
Source: See Appendix
Once  the  decline  in  marital  fertility  had  begun,  the  drop  was  not  continuous.  In
many countries the downward trend was broken in the 1930s and 1940s, and there was
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an important recovery, a phenomenon which is colloquially known as the baby boom.
Fertility rates went on rising until the late 1950s or early 1960s.12
After World War II Western economies began a period of healthy growth.
Noticeable increases in GDP per capita gave parents greater economic autonomy from
their children. This phase of economic prosperity was accompanied by a range of social
spending policies. Social transfers relating to welfare, unemployment, pensions, health,
and housing subsidies doubled between 1960 and 1980 (Lindert 2004: 12–13). Public
spending on pensions shot up during this period: in 1980 pensions accounted for 8.4%
of GDP in OECD countries (almost twice the figure for 1960). Governments’
generosity  in  distributing  public  money  can  be  seen  in  the  way  more  people  gained
access to pensions and the retirement age came down, despite the increase in life
expectancy (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000: 39–42). As Gaullier (1982: 176) concludes,
“[in] the period following World War II, old age became retirement.”
According to our statistical models, the collapse in marital fertility from the 1960s
onwards, known as the baby bust, would be a logical phenomenon.13 The increase in
income per capita enabled parents to find alternatives to the traditional strategy of
having children in order to provide for future needs (disease, incapacity,
unemployment, retirement) and they became economically independent from their
children. The massive growth in public social transfers aimed at the mature and elderly
population (pensions and health care) also made it less necessary to have a large family:
once again, the welfare state took over responsibility for responding to most of the basic
needs of the elderly population.
Where the panel cointegrating regressions was a dynamic model used to capture
the long-term relationship between the variables, the country panel fixed and time
effects generalized least squares model analyzes the contemporary effects and also
takes account of the heterogeneity between different countries. Both models bring to
light the same causal relationships which we established previously in our discussion of
the hypotheses concerning marital fertility and the different socioeconomic variables.
12 A full analysis of the reasons for the baby boom and the baby bust lies beyond the scope of this article.
13 The baby boom would also represent a logical response made by families to a period of prolonged political,
economic, and military crisis (the Crash of 1929 and World War II) which slashed family income and
undermined the incipient welfare policies that some countries had initiated a few decades previously. Faced
with these extraordinary circumstances, families reverted to the traditional strategy as the safest way of
preparing for life’s challenges: having a large family. The phenomena of the baby boom and baby bust will
form the subject of a much more detailed study in a future publication.
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5. Measures to encourage fertility within the welfare state
Given the results obtained from the statistical models in Table 2, based on the
information provided by Lindert (1994, 2004) on social transfers, we can say that the
increased social spending per capita on older people has led to low fertility. We shall
now address the question of whether directing more resources toward families increases
fertility rates. Using data from the OECD from 1960 onwards (see the Appendix for
details of sources), we were able to gather disaggregated information on different
measures aimed at meeting the needs of the mature/elderly population on the one hand
and children and young people on the other. Specifically, we calculated the social
transfers per capita dedicated to health and pensions and to family and child allowances
and benefits between 1960 and 2010. We were thus able to assess the effect that each of
these had on marital fertility. We performed the following panel models where we
could include different socioeconomic variables. Furthermore, we also consider it
necessary to control for fixed and time effects:
ܫ௚௜,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ∗ lnGDPpc௜,௧ + ߚଶ ∗ lnFamilypc௜,௧ + ߚଷ ∗ lnHealthpenspc௜,௧ +
ߚସ ∗ Education௜,௧ + ߚହ ∗ qଶହ ଴௜,௧ + ߚ଺ ∗ Urbpop௜,௧ + ߓ௧ + ߙ௜ + ߝ௜ ,௧,     (7)
where Ig is the intensity of marital fertility, GDPpc is the gross domestic product per
capita for each country (inflation-adjusted expressed in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars), Healthpenspc is the social transfers per capita dedicated to health and
pensions, Familypc is the social transfers per capita dedicated to family and child
allowances and benefits, 25q0 is the probability of surviving to age 25 (both sexes),
Education is the average years of total schooling for both sexes, Urbpop is the
percentage of urban population, ߓ௧ is a vector of yearly dummies controlling for time
effects, and ߙ௜ is a set of fixed effect accounting for the heterogeneity between
countries. The values of the variables GDPpc, Familypc, and Healthpenspc were
transformed into logarithms, because inspection of the graphic representation of trends
in these variables indicated to us that from 1960 onwards their growth was exponential.
See the Appendix for the sources from which we obtained these data.
Table 3 shows that the signs of the estimators of the variables GDPpc and 25q0 for
the period 1960–2010 were as expected, and are fully consistent with those obtained in
Tables 1 and 2. The variable Education in Model 3 has the expected sign, but this loses
significance  in  Models  4  and  5.  It  is  striking  that  the  sign  of  the  estimator  for  the
variable Urbpop is positive (albeit with a very small value). This indicates that, at least
for the period 1960–2010, the concentration of the population in cities may have had a
bearing on the increase in levels of marital fertility. Although many studies testify to the
well-established phenomenon that in modern European culture fertility rates are
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generally higher in rural areas than in cities (Jaffe 1944; Notestein 1945; Oppenheim
1997), we should not be surprised that there has recently been a change in sign here. It
has been amply documented that the sign of many well-established associations may
change over time, at both macro- and microlevels. It is therefore possible that the
historical negative relationship between the percentage of urban population and marital
fertility might have been changing in the last few decades.
Table 3 also shows that when social transfers designed to cover part of the costs of
bringing up children (Familypc) increased, this had a positive effect on marital fertility.
Conversely, increasing those benefits dedicated to the elderly population
(Healthpenspc) had a negative effect. The relevant coefficients, Healthpenspc and
Familypc, have negative and positive signs respectively, and are statistically significant,
just as our hypothesis suggests, even when other variables such as GDPpc, Education,
25q0, and Urbpop are used as controls and fixed and time effects are included. Model 8
in Table 3 includes the variables Healthpenspc and Familypc with lags. The signs and
statistical significance of the estimators are the same as in Models 6 and 7, where no
lags are applied.
These figures probably indicate that what really dissuades couples from having
children is not so much the existence of a welfare state but its imbalance, which gives it
a stronger bias toward caring for the elderly than toward helping young couples with the
costs of childrearing.
Figure 2 shows the actual marital fertility index (Ig) values and those predicted (by
Model 8 in Table 3) for each country. The fit of the predicted values to the actual values
is very close. The only exceptions are Ireland and Spain, probably because in both
countries the marital fertility rates dropped over a very short period of time.
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Table 3: Country panel fixed and time effects generalized least squares
(Ig dependent variable), developed countries (1960–2010)
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Intercept 0.996 *** 0.867 *** 0.976 *** 0.952 *** 1.351 *** 1.334 *** 0.566 *** 1.413 ***
0.070 0.079 0.081 0.082 0.099 0.098 0.051 0.097
ln GDPpc –0.072 *** –0.060 *** –0.066 *** –0.068 *** –0.127 *** –0.111 *** –0.120 ***
0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.012
25q0 0.583 *** 0.346 ** 0.323 * 0.684 ** 0.463 0.918 *** 0.457
0.172 0.173 0.173 0.322 0.330 0.340 0.336
Education –0.006 *** –0.006 *** 0.002 0.003 * 5.81E-05 3.53E-03 **
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Urbpop 0.001 * 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
3.41E-04 3.38E-04 3.49E-04 3.64E-04 3.50E-04
ln Familypc 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.007 **
0.003 0.003 0.003
ln Healthpenspc –0.025 *** –0.061 ***
0.009 0.008
ln Familypct-1 0.011 ***
0.003
ln Healthpenspct-1 –0.027 ***
0.009
n countries   24    24   23   23   21   21   21   21
N data points   1,104    1,104   1,055   1,055   937   937   937   916
R2 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84
Note: p-value *** <0.01, ** <0.05, * <0.1; standard errors in italics
Source: See Appendix
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted marital fertility values (Ig), developed countries
(1960–2010)
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Figure 2: (Continued)
Notes: Predicted marital fertility values (Ig) calculated using Model 8 in Table 3
Source: See Appendix
6. Conclusions
In this research we show that, as demographic transition theory originally maintained,
the decline in mortality and economic factors both played a leading role in the historical
decline of fertility. In a similar vein, as we would expect, throughout the demographic
transition the increase in educational level had a negative impact on marital fertility
rates. We used two different statistical analysis techniques to examine the impact in
both the long term and the short term, and obtained statistically robust results showing
essentially the same, which we take as evidence of the solidity of our analysis.
In broad terms, we can conclude that welfare systems were originally designed in
such a way as to devote much greater attention to the needs of the elderly population
than to those of couples who want to have children. It is this imbalance in the system of
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public social transfers which has historically tended to deter people from having
children. In fact we consider that, from the economic point of view, the present welfare
system places a heavy burden on those who decide to have a family.
Obviously this general description of the rewards and punishments established by
welfare states in the developed world needs to be qualified by many other
considerations. There are major differences between countries concerning child
benefits, policies on housing for young people, legal protection for the rights of
working parents, family/work reconciliation policies, availability of public nurseries,
and so on. Some of these differences probably account for the variations that we
observe in the fertility rates from one country to another. As we have seen, the countries
which are directing more resources toward families are those where the marital fertility
index is highest.
As Gábor Regös (2014) says, one of the possible solutions to this problem is “the
introduction of children pension: a system in which pension would also depend on the
number of taxpayer children brought up by the pensioner.” Paul Demeny (2015)
outlines two radical policy proposals to raise fertility rates. The first one would give full
voting rights to all citizens, including children under the current voting age. The voting
rights  of  minors  would  be  exercised  by  parental  proxy.  The  second,  which  is  more
radical and more drastic, runs along the lines described by Regös (2014). The material
status of the elderly would be conditioned by the number and productivity of their
children. The children’s contributions to the social security system, in Demeny’s view,
should be transferred directly – either completely or in a substantial proportion – to
their parents.
We may conclude that a new kind of public social transfer model needs to be
designed which will minimize the damaging consequences that our current welfare
states have had with regard to birth rates, in that they spread the income generated by
children across society once they start working, but fail to support the costs of their
upbringing  (which  have  to  be  met  by  parents  alone).  A  fairer  system  should  be
implemented which would ensure that the benefits of children’s labors would be
enjoyed first and foremost by their parents.
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Appendix
Princeton marital fertility index (Ig)
The provincial and national values for the various Princeton indices were obtained from
Coale and Watkins (1986). Data available from the following University of Princeton
website: http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/pefp/. The author of the present paper
calculated the indices for Table A-1.
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Table A-1: Years for which the present author calculated the Princeton marital
fertility index Ig (except where specified)
National level
Australia 1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006
Austria 1951, 1991, 2001
Belgium 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2010
Canada From 1852 to 1911 the data is from Quebec, Pouyez and Lavoie (1983); 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961,
1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011
Czechoslovakia 1947, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Denmark 1840 and 1847, Matthiessen (1985); 1950, 1981, 1940, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
England and Wales From 1543 to 1850 using inverse projection techniques, Anderson et al. (2001); 1939, 1951, 1991, 1995,
2001, 2010
Finland 1991, 2001, 2011
France From 1740 to 1911, Weir (1994); 1946, 1954, 1975, 1990, 1999, 2004, 2008
Germany 1946, 1950, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2010
Greece 1920, 1981, 1991, 2001
Hungary 1949, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990, 2001, 2005, 2010
Iceland 1971, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2006, 2010
Ireland 1946, 1951, 1966, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2006
Italy 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006, 2010
Japan 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1940, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005,
2010
The Netherlands 1947, 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
New Zealand 1891, 1911, 1921, 1936, 1945, 1951, 1956, 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006
Norway 1801, 1866, 1911, 1946, 1950, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011
Portugal 1991, 2001, 2011
Russian Federation 1989, 2002, 2010
Spain 1860, 1877, 1950, 1991, 2001, 2006, 2011
Sweden 1750, 1800, 1850, 1870, 1890, 1910, 1920, 1940, 1945, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005, 2010
Switzerland 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
United States The Ig values for the years 1848, 1858, 1868 and 1878, Hacker (2003); 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920,
1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2006, 2010
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Table A-2: Sources of information concerning the probability of death in the
first 25 years of life (25q0)
National level
Australia From 1885 to 1905 (indigenous population excluded in 1885), Australian Bureau of Statistics
(http://www.abs.gov.au/); from 1921 to 2007, Human Mortality Database (HMD) (www.mortality.org)
Austria From 1870 to 1931, Human Life-Table Database (HLTD) (http://www.lifetable.de/cgi-bin/datamap.plx);
from1947 to 2008, HMD
Belgium From 1827 to 1832, estimated from the e0 provided by Quetelet (1851), taking into account the Regional
Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1841 to 2007, HMD
Canada From 1831 to 1911, Bourbeau, Légaré, and Émond (1997); from 1921 to 2007, HMD
Czechoslovakia From 1875 to 1937, estimated from the e0 provided by Srb (1962), taking into account the Regional Model
Life Tables “East” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1920 to 1949, HLTD; from 1950 to 2008, HMD
Denmark From 1665 to 1835 using inverse projection techniques, estimated from the e0 provided by Johansen (2002)
and Johansen and Oeppen (2001), taking into account the Regional Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and
Demeny (1983); from 1782 to 1832, estimated from the e0 provided by Andersen (1979), taking into account
the Regional Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1835 to 2008, HMD
England and Wales From 1541 to 1870, using inverse projection techniques, estimated from the e0 provided by Wrigley et al.
(1997), taking into account the third English life table by Wrigley and Schofield (1981: 714); from 1841 to
2006 (England and Wales), HMD
Finland From 1751 to 1875, Turpeinen and Kannisto (1997); from 1878 to 2008, HMD
France 1745, Vallin (1991); from 1752 to 1802, Blayo (1975); from 1806 to 1901, Bonneuil (1997); from 1902 to
2007, HMD
Germany From 1810 to 1850, Imhof (1990); from 1871 to 1933, HLTD; 1950 (only West Germany), HLTD; from 1956
to 2008, HMD
Greece From 1850 to 1922, estimated from the e0 provided by Siampos (1989), taking into account the Regional
Model Life Tables “South” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1928 to 2002, HLTD
Hungary From 1900 to 1941, Hungarian Central Statistical Office (1992); from 1950 to 2006, HMD
Iceland From 1838 to 2008, HMD
Ireland 1830 and 1848, estimated from the e0 provided by Boyle and Ó Gráda (1986), taking into account the
Regional Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and Demeny (1983); 1901 and 1911, estimated from the e0
provided by Ó Gráda (1979), taking into account the Regional Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and
Demeny (1983); from 1926 to 1946, HLTD; from 1950 to 2006, HMD
Italy From 1650 to 1881 (only North Italy), using inverse projection techniques, estimated from the e0 obtained in
the annual inverse projection carried out by Galloway (1994), taking into account the Regional Model Life
Tables “West” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1872 to 2006, HMD
Japan From 1895 to 1935, HLTD; from 1947 to 2008, HMD
The Netherlands From 1820 to 1846, estimated from the e0 provided by Rothenbacher (2002), taking into account the
Regional Model Life Tables “West” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1850 to 2008, HMD
New Zealand From 1876 to 1941 (only the non-Maori population), estimated from the e0 provided by Pool (1982, 1985,
and 1993) and Pool and Cheung (2003, 2005), taking into account the Regional Model Life Tables “West” by
Coale and Demeny (1983); 1936, Statistics New Zealand (http://www.stats.govt.nz/); from 1948 to 2008,
HMD
Norway From 1738 to 1843, estimated from the e0 provided by Brunborg (1976), taking into account the Regional
Model Life Tables “North” by Coale and Demeny (1983)); from 1846 to 2008, HMD
Portugal From 1890 to 1920, Rodrigues Veiga, Guardado Moreira, and Fernandes (2004); 1930, Nazareth (1977);
from 1940 to 2009, HMD
Russian Federation 1885 (Russia), estimated from the e0 provided by Blum and Troitskaja (1996), taking into account the
Regional Model Life Tables “East” by Coale and Demeny (1983); from 1896 to 1958 (Russia), HLTD; from
1959 to 2008 (Russia), HMD
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Table A-3: Panel unit root test (20 cross-sectional units)
Level and constant Level, constant, andtrend
First difference and
constant
Im, Pesaran, Shin 0.98 0.99 0.00
Ig ADF–Fisher 0.98 0.99 0.00
PP–Fisher 0.99 1 0.00
Im, Pesaran, Shin 0.47 0.97 0.00
25q0 ADF–Fisher 0.25 0.90 0.00
PP–Fisher 0.00 0.99 0.00
Im, Pesaran, Shin 1 1 0.00
GDPpc ADF–Fisher 1 1 0.00
PP–Fisher 1 1 0.00
Im, Pesaran, Shin 1 0.53 0.00
Education ADF–Fisher 1 0.29 0.00
PP–Fisher 1 0.99 0.00
The results shown in Table A-4 illustrate the cointegration relations in the panel
and individually. In the case of panel cointegration, we find sufficient evidence to reject
the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration, which means that we accept the
alternative hypothesis of cointegration in the panel of countries. In the individual case,
we find results which warrant special attention. To summarize the results that are stable
across the different time lags, we need to mention that Sweden has no cointegration
relationship; Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the United States have a cointegration
relationship, while Denmark and England and Wales have two cointegrations. The other
countries vary if we change the time lag. For this reason, we have adopted the following
analytical strategy: First, we computed a cointegration regression for the whole panel
(15 units); second, we analysed only the case of countries with a cointegration equation
(four units); thirdly, we added those countries with one and two cointegrations (six
units); and finally, we added Sweden, which is the only country with no cointegration.
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Table A-4: Panel cointegration tests (20 countries)
Fisher (combined Johansen test)
Series: Ig, GDPpc, 25q0, and Education
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.* Fisher Stat.*
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob. (from max-eigen test) Prob.
None 540.0 0.0000 447.70 0.0000
At most 1 163.1 0.0000 124.00 0.0000
At most 2 78.4 0.0003 76.29 0.0005
At most 3 48.5 0.1680 48.48 0.1680
Kao Residual Cointegration Test
Series: Ig, GDPpc, 25q0, and Education
Null hypothesis: No cointegration
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 11
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
t-Statistic Prob.
ADF -3,782,181 0.0001
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